I don’t know if Welsh TV and newspaper editors read Pedryn Drycin last week, but press attention on the debate
over the Wales Bill, ‘reserved powers’ and the possibility of conflict between
Whitehall and Cardiff Bay increased significantly yesterday in anticipation of
the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee’s second evidence-taking session
on the question, a session which saw the First Minister and the Presiding
Officer questioned by Assembly Members David Melding, Alun Davies, Suzy Davies
and Dafydd Elis-Thomas.
The Presiding Officer’s three ‘success criteria’ for the
Wales Bill of ‘clarity, practicality and no roll-back’ got some press
attention, but it is the session with the First Minister that is of most
interest to keen observers of Cardiff Bay/Whitehall manoeuvring. Regarding additional
powers for the Assembly, the First Minister said nothing that he has not said already
over the last few months. He reiterated that the ‘St. David’s Day Agreement’
was not an agreement at all, and that its modest, lowest-common-denominator, proposals
did not represent a “lasting settlement” for Wales. He restated that full
implementation of Silk II, along with additional powers that have recently been
conceded to Scotland such as Air Passenger Duty, represented the “minimum” that
the Wales Bill should be delivering, and that whilst devolution of the Welsh justice
system was not necessarily an immediate priority, it was inevitable in the
medium term. ‘Steady as she goes’ in that respect really.
What Carwyn Jones did articulate quite explicitly for the
first time yesterday was his ‘rejection’ of the specific list of reservations
which had been appended to the UK Government’s Command Paper, explaining (as I argued
last week) that some of them would render the Assembly less powerful than it had
been when it was instituted in 1999. He called it a “wish list” that had
probably been put together in a round-robin of Whitehall departments, suggesting
(rather generously in my opinion) that the UK Government (and by that I suppose
he means David Cameron and senior Cabinet colleagues) did not necessarily agree
with their officials. Notwithstanding, proposing to reserve the ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’
law in their entirety to Westminster (which is what the Command Paper does) would
be a theoretical, technical and practical absurdity, and the First Minister was
rightly dismissive of giving it even passing consideration.
Whilst the First Minister was not as generous as the
Presiding Officer in saying that the Command Paper appendix was a “good start”,
they both concluded that there was nothing to do but "wait and see" how the
Wales Bill is drafted over the summer, and then respond on an
inter-governmental basis in the case of the Welsh Government, and in the form
of a committee-led report and plenary-backed motion in the case of the
Assembly. ‘You show your hand first Mr Crabb’, as it were, ‘and then we’ll show
ours’, whilst raising an eyebrow and cocking one’s head to indicate that the Wales
Office is probably a long way off the mark at the moment…
But perhaps the most interesting exchange of the session was
that of the First Minister with Alun Davies, a Labour member whose personal
misfortune at having lost his seat in the Cabinet has, for objective observers,
greatly enhanced the quality of debate on the back benches and on Assembly committees.
Mr Davies seemed, as he seemed in the previous session, frustrated that ‘we’ (and
by ‘we’ I mean that group of cross-party pro-devolution unionists to which Mr
Davies belongs) all seem clear on the objective (an enduring system of domestic
‘home rule’ for Wales within some form of UK federation), but cannot simply
spell it out, say once and for all what functions, powers and responsibilities
should be exclusive to Wales and which should be reserved to the UK.
I can’t be certain, but I suspect that Mr Davies’s
frustration is due to the fact that he believes that the intellectual argument
for an expansive vision of self-government is very strong and can be won quite easily
at the moment, that the UK Government simply needs to be told what the ‘end
point’ for unionist Welsh home-rulers is and that they will concede it, given
what’s at stake in Scotland and Europe, and how badly they will need allies in
the coming years. He gently pressed the First Minister to share that vision
with the committee on several occasions. “What are the powers […] that will
lead to a lasting settlement?” etc., etc. “Not those on offer” was the First
Minister’s reply, as he repeatedly declined to spell out the constitutional specifics
of a ‘home-ruled’ Wales.
In fairness to Carwyn Jones, it might just be political hara-kiri to spell out your ultimate
objective when you don’t have the power to deliver it (I’m no strategist), and
he and his supporters may have already concluded that they are not going to achieve
their goal at the first attempt. If ‘full and final’ settlement is at play, and
you are not that sure of victory, you don’t attack the enemy with everything that
you have got on the first charge.
So it is to be ‘wait and see’ rather than a full frontal
attack then, an ambush in the hills rather than a set-piece battle on the
plains. All very Welsh of course, but perhaps like Mr Davies, I’d rather hoped
we’d moved on from the fear and caution of medieval Wales, that as a modern-day collective
we could quietly and calmly agree our objectives, form a powerful coalition of the willing, and go out and achieve victory. Not
for the moment it seems.
The full meeting can be viewed here.